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Abstract
In this work we provide a connection between the Kochen-Specker theorem
in quantum mechanics and the failure of the principle truth functional-
ity in logic. By exploiting this connection, we import the formalism of
N-matrix theory and non-deterministic semantics to the foundations of
quantum mechanics. This is done by describing quantum states as partic-
ular valuations associated to infinite non-deterministic truth tables. This
allows us to introduce a natural interpretation of quantum states in terms
of a non-deterministic semantic. We also provide a similar construction for
arbitrary probabilistic theories based in orthomodular lattices, allowing
to study pots-quantum models using logical techniques.
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1 Introduction
According to the principle of truth-functionality or composability (TFP, from
now on), the truth-value of a complex formula is uniquely determined by the
truth-values of its subformulas. It is a basic principle of logic. However, as
explained in [1], many real world situations involve dealing with information
which is incomplete, vague or uncertain. And this is specially true for quantum
phenomena, where, only probabilistic assertions about possible events can be
tested in the lab. These situations pose a threat to the application of logical
systems obeying the principle of truth-functionality in those problems. As is
well known, the TFP fails in many logical systems of interest (see examples in
[2]).
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One possible way to deal with this situation is to relax the TFP. This is
the path followed in [3], where the idea of non-deterministic computations –
borrowed from automata and computability theory– is applied to evaluations
of truth-values of formulas. This leads to the introduction of non-deterministic
matrices (N-matrices). These are a natural generalization of ordinary multi-
valued matrices, in which the truth-value of a complex formula can be chosen
nondeterministically, out of some non-empty set of options [1, 3, 4, 5].
The Kochen-Specker theorem [6] is one of the most fundamental no-go the-
orems of quantum mechanics, and it holds in many probabilistic models of
interest [7, 8, 9]. It has far reaching consequences for the interpretation of the
quantum formalism (see for example [10]). In this work, we show that (i) due to
the Kochen-Specker theorem, the quantum equivalent of the principle of truth
functionality is false in the quantum formalism and, for this reason, (ii) N-
matrices can be used to describe quantum states and quantum states spaces.
This novel perspective opens the door to new fundamental questions, by intro-
ducing the possibility of interpreting quantum probabilities as a particular class
of non-classical valuations.
We also present a generalization of our approach to arbitrary probabilistic
models –including quantum and classical probabilistic ones as particular cases.
The study of post-quantum theories is a very active field of research nowadays,
since it provides an extraordinary ground for studying the fundamental princi-
ples that underly the quantum formalism (see for example, [11, 12, 13]). Further-
more, the study of contextual systems outside the quantum domain [14, 15, 16]
poses the question of looking for contextual models which are non quantum,
but non-classical either. Furthermore, non-standard probabilities have been
used to describe deviations of classical logic in decision making problems. As
an example, negative probabilities have been applied to the study of inconsis-
tent judgments [17]. Our extension could be useful for studying contextuality
[18, 19, 20, 21, 22] in quantum mechanics and generalized probabilistic models
from a novel logical perspective.
The logic-operational approach to quantum theory dates back to the 30’,
after the contribution of Birkhoff and von Neumann [23] (for further develop-
ments of the quantum logical approach, see [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38]). More recently, a growing interest is put in describing
logical structures associated to quantum computation [39, 40, 41, 42].
In this work, we give an interesting turn to the quantum logical approach,
by introducing a relatively recently discovered logical technique into the foun-
dations of quantum mechanics. As a result of our construction, we show that a
quantum logical entailment arises by appealing to the quantum non-deterministic
semantics. This is a step forward in the discussion whether there exists a well
behaved logic associated to the quantum formalism.
The paper is organized as follows. We start by reviewing the principle of
truth functionality in classical logics in section 2. Then, in section 3, we discuss
the Born rule and the Kochen-Specker and Gleason’s theorems from a quantum
logical perspective. We show there that the principle of truth functionality is
not valid in quantum mechanics. In section 4, we review the formalism of N-
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matrix theory and non-deterministic semantics. In section 5 we show how this
formalism can be used to describe quantum states, as a particular set of valu-
ations associated to infinite truth tables, that we first introduce here. We also
discuss extensions to generalized probabilistic models and detection of probabil-
ities with finite precision. In section 6 we discuss the possibility of developing
an logical consequence in quantum logic. Finally, in section 7, we draw our
conclusions.
2 The principle of truth functionality and alge-
bra homomorphisms
In this section we review the principle of truth functionality, in connection with
the notion of classical semantics and algebra homomorphisms. The reader with
a background in algebra and logic, may skip this section. We focus on the
homomorphisms between a given algebra and the two elements Boolean algebra
B2 = {0, 1}, endowed with the usual operations (that we denote by ∨˜, ∧˜,
and ¬˜). The principle of truth functionality is very important for our work,
because the KS theorem is expressed in terms of classical valuations satisfying
a functional behavior with respect to truth value assignments. We also discuss,
in the following, how non-deterministic semantics can be used to deal with the
failure of the TFP, and how they offer the possibility of understanding the
consequences of the KS theorem under a new light.
In this section we follow the treatment given in references [43, 44]. Let us
start with a definition of algebra that is relevant to our logical approach:
Definition 2.1. A type of algebras is a set F of function symbols, where, each
symbol f ∈ F has associated a natural number n, its arity.
Definition 2.2. Given a type F of algebras, an algebra of type F is a pair
A = 〈A,F 〉, where A is a set and F = (fAi )i∈I is a family of operations over
A, defined in such a way that, to each symbol of F of arity n, it corresponds
an n-ary operation fAi . The set A is the universe associated to the algebra.
Usually, one speaks about the algebra by referring to its universe only, in case
the the operations are clearly understood from the context. We also write fAi
instead fi, when no confusion can arise.
As an example, consider the algebra B2. Its universe is the set {0, 1} and its
operations are given by ∨˜, ∧˜ and ¬˜, with arity 2, 2 and 1, respectively.
2.1 Homomorphisms
An homomorphism between algebras is defined as follows:
Definition 2.3. Let A=〈A,F 〉 and B = 〈B,G〉 be algebras of the same type
and let h : A→ B a function. We say that h is an homomorphism from a A to
3
B, if for any of n-ary simbol fA ∈ F we have that, for every n-tuple (a1, ..., an)
of elements in A:
h(fA(a1,...,an)) = f
B
(h(a1),...,h(an))
being fB the operation in B which corresponds to fA in A.
If an homomorphism h is a bijection, it is called an isomorphism.
Each propositional language and its well formed formulas are defined by the
set of connectives, whenever there is a denumerable set of propositional variables
and punctuation symbols (under the assumption that we have recursive rules
for their formation). Thus, to each language it corresponds a type, in the same
way as it occurs for algebras. For more discussion about this, we refer the
reader to [45]. In order illustrate these ideas, let us consider the implicational
propositional calculus. The only connective of this calculus is “→”, which is
binary. Thus, each formula which is not a variable is of the form a → b. This
is a type 〈2〉 language. The classical propositional calculus with its connectives
“¬”, “∨”, “∧” and “→”, is of the type 〈1, 2, 2, 2〉.
We can valuate the formulas of a language L in algebras of the same type,
proceeding similarly as with homomorphisms between algebras. Valuations are
defined in such a way that each n-ary connective is transformed into a corre-
sponding n-ary operation. Valuations assign to each formula of the language an
element of an algebra, that we may think of as its truth value. In the classical
case, this algebra is B2, and 0 and 1 are identified as the values “true” and
“false”, respectively. In the classical propositional calculus this construction
gives place to the well known truth tables.
At this point, some readers might be interested in understanding with more
detail the link between the type of a language and a type of algebra. For self
completeness, we have included section 2.1.1 below, in which we explain these
notions with more detail.
We now give the definition of valuation for a propositional language:
Definition 2.4. Let L be a propositional language whose set of connectives
is (ci)i∈I and let 〈A,G〉 be an algebra where G = (gi)i∈I . A (deterministic)
valuation is a function v : L → A, such that for each n-ary connective c and
formulas B1, ...Bn, it satisfies
v(c(B1, ..., Bn)) = g
c(v(B1), ..., v(Bn)),
being gc the n-ary operation in A corresponding to c.
From the above definition of classical valuation, it follows that the value of
gc(v(B1), ..., v(Bn)) is determined by the values v(B1), v(B1),....,v(Bn), that
the valuation v assigns to the propositions B1,....,Bn out of which the formula
c(B1, ..., Bn) is composed. This is the exact content of the principle
of truth functionality. A truth functional operator is an operator whose
values are determined by those of its components. All classical operators are
truth functional. Accordingly, classical propositional logic is a truth-functional
propositional logic.
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As an example, in classical propositional logic, the algebra is given by B2.
Thus, for example, the value v(P ∨ Q) assigned by a classical valuation v to
the compound proposition P ∨ Q, is determined solely by the values v(P ) and
v(Q). in other words, we have v(P ∨ Q) = v(P )∨˜v(Q). Similar examples can
be given for ∧˜ and ¬˜. In section 3 we see how these notions can be extended to
the quantum formalism.
2.1.1 Types of languages and homomorphisms between structures
For a detailed treatment of the content of this section, see [45]. Let us start
with definition of type:
Definition 2.5. A type (or signature) is a set τ of symbols which has the form:
τ = (
⋃
1≤n
Rn) ∪ (
⋃
1≤m
Fm) ∪ C,
where Rn is a set of relational n-arity symbols, Fm is a set of m-arity functional
symbols and C is a set of symbols for constants (or any other distinguished
symbols of the system), which are referred as 0-arity functions.
The relational and functional symbols acquire meaning only when they are
considered in connection with a semantic or an interpretation. Thus, they are
interpreted as relations, functions and distinguished elements, respectively, in a
given universe of interpretation. It is necessary to define a language of a given
type in order to apply the definitions of valuation and homomorphism, and then,
to relate the notion of language with that of algebra (or structure in the more
general case).
In this work, we will restrict ourselves to the propositional calculus only.
But we include here the definition of first order languages, because it can be
useful for the development of quantum-inspired languages.
Definition 2.6. The symbols for building expressions of a language of type τ
–that we denote by Lτ– are the following:
1. v0, v1, ..., vn, ... (individual variables).
2. (, ) , , (auxiliary symbols).
3. ¬, ∨, ∧, →,... (propositional connectives).
4. = (equality symbol).
5. ∃ (existential quantifier).
6. The symbols of τ .
The symbols contained in 1 to 4 above, are usually referred to as the canon-
ical interpretation, and are called logical symbols ; the symbols contained in 5
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and 6 may have a variable interpretation, and are called non-logical symbols.
This is the reason why τ determines the type of language.
Some remarks are in order. In the quantum formalism, it is natural to
consider as individual variables to the orthogonal projections of the Hilbert
space. In classical logic, it is usual to work with only two connectives, as for
example, ¬ and ∨, and to define the rest of the connectives as a function of
them. This is done in proof theory to simplify the object language. But the
possibility of doing this simplification depends on the specific properties of the
given language (i.e., connectives are not always inter-definable). In this work
we will restrict the use to ∨, ¬ and ∧. Regarding point 4 above: languages
containing this symbol are called languages with an equality. It is possible to
define languages without identity, and to define identity using other primitive
symbols. There are examples of this in some set theoretical frameworks, where
equality is defined in terms of axioms that use a ∈ symbol. In our case, the
equality symbol will not be included. Regarding 5: we will not use quantifiers
in this work for the quantum case.
Now we give the standard definitions of terms, expressions and formulas.
Definition 2.7. Let τ be a type. An expression of type τ , or a τ-expression, is
a finite sequence of symbols of Lτ .
Definition 2.8. The set of terms of type τ , or τ-terms, is the least set X of
τ-expressions, such that:
• {vi : 0 ≤ i} ∪C ⊆ X, where C ⊆ τ , is the set of constants of τ .
• If f ∈ Fm ⊆ τ , 1 ≤ m and t1, ..., tm ∈ X, then f(t1, ..., tm) ∈ X.
Definition 2.9. A τ-formula is atomic if it is an expression of the form:
(t1 = t2) or P (t1, ..., tn), where t1, ..., tn are τ-terms and P ∈ Rn ⊆ τ .
Definition 2.10. The set of formulas of type τ is the least set X of τ-expressions,
such that:
• {α : α is an atomic τ − formula} ⊆ X.
• If α, β ∈ X, then (¬α), (α ∨ β), (α ∧ β) and (α→ β) ∈ X.
• If α ∈ X and vi is a variable, then (∃viα) ∈ X.
Definition 2.11. A τ-interpretation (or τ-structure), for a language L is a
pair U = 〈A, I〉, where:
• A 6= ∅.
• I : τ → A ∪ {f : Am → A, 1 ≤ m} ∪ (⋃{P (An) : 1 ≤ n}).
Where P (An) denotes the power set of An, and such that for any x ∈ τ :
If x ∈ Rn, I(x) = xU ⊆ An.
If x ∈ Fm, I(x) = xU : Am → A.
If x ∈ C, I(x) = xU ∈ A.
I is the interpretation function of U over the universe A.
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Usually, if τ = {x1, ..., xn}, we denote the struture U = 〈A, I〉 as follows:
U = 〈A, xU1 , ..., xUn 〉
In our case, where the language is formed by projection operators acting on a
Hilbert space, endowed with their respective connectives, the structure U will
have a universe A and interpretations for the connectives, which are symbols
of functions. This is, in such a structure there will be no interpreted relation
symbols. For this reason, the structure associated to our language is an algebra
(and not a more general structure), and we can relate it with algebras of the
same type as we did in defining valuations and homomorphisms for a language
of our type.
Definition 2.12. Let U = 〈A, I〉 y B = 〈B, J〉, dos τ-structures, h is an
homomorphism from U to B if, and only if:
• h is a function from A to B; h : A→ B.
• For each Pn ∈ τ and each a1, ..., an ∈ A,
〈a1, ..., an〉 ∈ PUn iff 〈h(a1), ..., h(an)〉 ∈ PBn .
• For each fn ∈ τ and each a1, ..., an ∈ A,
h(fUn (a1, ..., an)) = f
B
n (h(a1), ..., h(an)).
• For each c ∈ τ, h(cU) = cB.
It can be seen how this definition for homomorphisms between structures gen-
eralizes the one that we gave for an homomorphism between algebras. This is a
consequence of the fact that we are dealing with a language of type τ that only
has function symbols (which are the connections of our language).
3 Quantum states and the Gleason and Kochen-
Specker theorems
In this section we review two of the most important results in the foundations
of quantum mechanics: Gleason [46, 47] and Kochen-Specker [6, 8, 9] theorems.
The fundamental properties underlying these theorems allow us to introduce
N-matrices in the quantum formalism. We discuss truth functionality in the
quantum domain.
3.1 Quantum probabilities and Gleason’s theorem
An elementary experiment associated to a quantum system is given by a yes-no
test, i.e., a test in which we get the answer “yes” or the answer “no” [27]. As is
well known, elementary tests associated to quantum systems are represented by
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orthogonal projections. Let P(H) denote the set of all closed subspaces of H.
Let B(H) be the set of bounded operators acting on a separable Hilbert space
H. An operator P ∈ B(H), is said to be an orthogonal projection if it satisfies
P 2 = P andP = P ∗. (1)
Projectors and closed subspaces can be put in a one to one correspondence,
by assigning to each orthogonal projection its image. Thus, closed subspaces
and orthogonal projections can be considered as interchangeable notions (and
thus, we will use them interchangeably in the following). The set of all closed
subspaces of H can be endowed with a orthocomplemented lattice structure
L(H) = 〈P(H), ∩, ⊕, ¬, 0, 1〉, where ∩ is the closed subspace intersection, ⊕
the closure of the sum, and ¬(S) is the orthogonal complement S⊥ of a subspace
S [31]. This lattice was discovered by Birkhoff and von Neumann, who coined
the term Quantum Logic [23]. The main characteristic of this quantum structure
is that it is a non-boolean lattice. It is always modular in the finite dimensional
case and and never modular in the infinite one [31].
In general, any observable quantity, can be represented by a self-adjoint
operator. For every self-adjoint operator A, if the system is prepared in state
ρ, its mean value is given by the formula:
〈A〉 = tr(ρA) (2)
Due to the spectral theorem, self-adjoint operators are in one to one correspon-
dence with projective valued measures (PVM)[48]. Let B be the Borel set of
the real line. Given a self-adjoint operator A, its projective valued measureMA
is a map [31]:
MA : B 7→ P(H) (3)
such that
1. MA(0) = 0
2. MA(R) = 1
3. MA(∪j(Bj)) =
∑
jMA(Bj), for any disjoint familly Bj
4. MA(B
c) = 1−MA(B) = (MA(B))⊥
where 0 is the empty set ∅, 0 the null subspace and 1 the total space H.
In quantum mechanics, states can be considered as functions that assign
probabilities to the elements of L(H) as follows:
µ : L(H) −→ [0; 1] (4)
such that:
1. µ(0) = 0 (0 is the null subspace).
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2. µ(P⊥) = 1− s(P )
3. For any pairwise orthogonal and denumerable family Pj , µ(
∨
j Pj) =∑
j µ(Pj)
Gleason’s theorem [46, 47] asserts that whenever dim(H) ≥ 3, the set C(L(H))
of all measures of the form 4 can be put into one to one correspondence with the
set S(H) of all positive, hermitian and trace-class operators of trace one acting
in H. Given P ∈ L(H), the correspondence between ρ ∈ S(H) and its induced
probability measure µρ is given by
µρ(P ) = tr(ρP ) (5)
It will be important for us to recall how probabilities are defined in a classical
setting. Thus, given a set Ω, let us consider a σ-algebra Σ ⊆ P(Ω) of subsets.
Then, a Kolmogorovian probability measure will be given by a function
µ : Σ→ [0, 1] (6)
which satisfies
1. µ(∅) = 0
2. µ(Ac) = 1− µ(A), where (. . .)c denotes set theoretical complement
3. for any pairwise disjoint and denumerable family {Ai}, µ(
⋃
iAi) =
∑
i µ(Ai).
The above conditions 3.1 are known as Kolmogorov’s axioms [49], and are very
useful for theoretical purposes. The main difference between classical and quan-
tum probabilities —pass their similitude in shape— comes from the fact that
the σ-algebra Σ appearing in in 3.1 is Boolean, while L(H) is not. This is
the reason why quantum probabilities are also called non-Kolmogorovian (or
non-boolean) probability measures (for more discussion on this subject, see for
example [50, 51, 52, 53]; for the connection between quantum probabilities and
quantum information theory, see [54, 55]).
The lattice P(H) of closed subspaces of a separable Hilbert spaces and the
Boolean algebras (such as those appearing in 3.1), are all examples of the more
general family of orthomodular lattices [56]. A lattice L is said to be orthomod-
ular (or weak modular) if it is orthocomplemented and, whenever x ≤ y , then
y = x∨(y∧x⊥). It turns out that the orthogonal projections associated to a von
Neumann algebra form an orthomodular lattice [31]. Also, a rigorous treatment
of quantum theories –including models with infinitely many degrees of freedom–
can be made in terms of [51]. Boolean algebras –such as those appearing in 3.1–
are particular cases of orthomodular lattices. Thus, we can conceive the state
of a general physical system described by a measure over an arbitrary complete
orthomodular lattice L as follows:
µ : L→ [0, 1] (7)
which satisfies
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1. µ(0) = 0
2. µ(a⊥) = 1− µ(a), where (. . .)⊥ denotes orthocomplement
3. for any pairwise orthogonal and denumerable family of elements {ai}i∈I ,
µ(
∨
i ai) =
∑
i µ(ai).
When L is Boolean, we obtain a classical probabilistic model. L(H) is a par-
ticular case among a vast family of alternative models of physical systems.
As a consequence of the orthomodular law, it easily follows that:
Proposition 3.1. For every p, q ∈ L and every state µ, we have
p ∧ q ≤ p⇒ µ(p ∧ q) ≤ µ(p)
and
p ≤ p ∨ q ⇒ µ(p) ≤ µ(p ∨ q)
To finish this section, let us recall an important property of orthomodular
lattices that is useful to keep in mind in the following. Any orthomodular
lattice —even if it is non-Boolean— possesses Boolean subalgebras [56]. A state
defined by Eqns. (7), when restricted to a maximal Boolean subalgebra, defines
a Kolmogorovian probability measure such as (3.1). Moreover, in the quantum
formalism, a maximal observable A defines a maximal Boolean subalgebra BA ⊆
L(H), which is given by the range of MA [27].
3.2 The Kochen-Specker theorem and the failure of truth
functionality in quantum mechaics
The Kochen-Specker theorem is one of the cornerstones in the foundations of
quantum mechanics literature [6]. Kochen and Specker were looking for a de-
scription of quantum mechanics in terms of hidden variables, taking as a model
the relationship between classical statistical mechanics and thermodynamics.
But it turns out that this hidden variable theory cannot exist, and this is equiv-
alent to the following statement [6]:
Proposition 3.2. A function v : L(H) −→ {0, 1} having the property that∑
i v(Pi) = 1 for any family {Pi} of one dimensional orthogonal elements of
L(H) satisfying
∑
i Pi = 1, does not exists.
Due to its importance in the following, let us isolate the property that two
valued truth functions —according to the KS theorem— cannot possess:
Definition 3.3. A function v : L(H) −→ {0, 1} having the property that∑
i v(Pi) = 1 for any family {Pi} of one dimensional orthogonal elements of
L(H) satisfying
∑
i Pi = 1, is called a classically truth valued function.
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In order to give meaning to the above definition and understand what the
KS theorem says from a logical point of view, let us try to understand how
the notion of truth functionality can be conceived in the quantum domain. Let
us identify the quantum language with that of the lattice structure L(H) =
〈P(H),∨,∧,¬〉. It is clear that we can form, recursively, new propositions out
of any given set of propositions in the usual way (i.e., consider all possible
finite expressions such as (P ∨ Q) ∧ R, (¬P ∧ Q), and so on). If we want to
recreate the notion of classical valuation in quantum theory, there should exist
a function v : L(H) −→ {0, 1} assigning truth values to all possible elementary
propositions. In this way, we would have that, given a quantum system prepared
in a particular quantum state, all of its properties should satisfy being true or
false, and there should be no other possibility. But from the physical point of
view, there is another important condition to be fulfilled: according to the rules
of quantum mechanics, if proposition P is true (i.e., if v(P ) = 1), then, any
other proposition Q satisfying Q ≤ P⊥ should be false (v(Q) = 0). This follows
directly from the definition of quantum state: if P is true, its probability of
occurrence is equal to one, and the probability of occurrence of any orthogonal
property will be automatically zero (this follows directly from Eqns. (4); a
similar conclusion holds in generalized models by using Eqns. (7)).
But any (classical) valuation v, besides satisfying that v(P ) ∈ {0, 1} for
all P ∈ L(H), should satisfy some extra constrains. The first one, is that of
being an algebra homomorphism between L(H) and the two elements Boolean
algebra B2 = {0, 1} (defined at the beginning of section 2). Thus, for every P
and every family {Pi}ni=1, in analogy with the principle of truth functionality
given by definition 2.4, we should have:
v(∨iPi) = ∨˜iv(Pi) (8)
v(∧iPi) = ∧˜iv(Pi) (9)
v(¬P ) = ¬˜v(P ) = 1− v(P ) (10)
But the last condition, in particular, implies that for an orthonormal and com-
plete set of projections Pi (i.e.,
∑
i Pi = 1, PiPj = 0 and dim(Pi) = 1), if
v(Pi0 ) = 1 for some i0, then, v(Pj) = 0, for all j 6= i0 (this follows from the fact
that for j 6= i0, Pj ≤ 1− Pi0). Given that
∑
i Pi = 1, we must have v(Pi0), for
some i0 (this follows from v(1) = 1 and Eqn. (8)). In this way, any classical
valuation, should satisfy condition 3.3. But the existence of such a function is
strictly forbidden by the KS theorem. It follows that the canonical definition of
classical truth functionality is not valid in the quantum domain. This will be
naturally true for arbitrary probabilistic models, provided that their proposi-
tional structures satisfy the KS theorem (and this is quite true for a huge family
of models [7, 8, 9]). The above discussion is related to a well known fact: one
can define local classical valuations for maximal Boolean subalgebras of L(H),
but the Kochen-Specker theorem forbids the existence global ones (see sections
II and III of [6]; for more discussion on the subject, see [57, 58, 59]).
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Thus, if one looks carefully to Proposition 3.2, it is possible to recognize
that a very particular form of the principle of truth functionality fails in the
quantum realm. Namely, that there is no classical truth value assignment v
satisfying the functionality condition given in definition 3.3 (or equivalently,
the conditions 98 10). Indeed, in the KS paper [6] (see also [57]), it is proved
that this condition underlies the failure of a more general property. In order to
illustrate the idea, suppose that the observable represented by the self-adjoint
operator A has associated the real value a. Then, the observable represented
by A2, should have assigned the value a2. In this sense, observables are not
all independent, and neither the values assigned to them. This gives us a clue
for understanding why truth functionality is not valid in the quantum domain.
Following the spirit of the KS paper, let us define:
Definition 3.4. Let A(H) be the set of all self-adjoint operators acting on a
separable Hilbert space H. A function f : A(H) −→ R satisfies truth function-
ality if, for any Borel function g, if g(A) is the result of applying the function
g to A in the usual way, and fX is the result of applying f to an arbitrary
self-adjoint operator X, the condition fg(A) = g(fA) is satisfied.
But the above condition fails in quantum mechanics due to the Kochen-Specker
theorem (see section I in [6] and [7, 57]). Thus, we see that, the failure of
the above described sui generis version of truth functionality, is one of the key
features of quantum mechanics. And this is true for more general probabilistic
models, provided that they admit no global valuations to B2.
In the following sections, we exploit the failure of truth functionality in
quantum mechanics, and import into physics the solution given by logicians
to its equivalent failure in logical systems: we will connect the semantics of
N-matrix approach in logic with the formalism of quantum mechanics.
4 Non-deterministic semantics
Non-deterministic multi-valued matrices (Nmatrices) are a fruitful and quickly
expanding field of research introduced in [3, 4, 5] (see also [60, 61]). Since then
it has been rapidly developing towards a foundational logical theory and has
found numerous applications [1]. The novelty of Nmatrices is in extending the
usual many-valued algebraic semantics of logical systems by importing the idea
of non-deterministic computations, and allowing the truth value of a formula to
be chosen non-deterministically out of a given set of options. Nmatrices have
proved to be a powerful tool, the use of which preserves all the advantages
of ordinary many-valued matrices, but is applicable to a much wider range of
logics. Indeed, there are many useful (propositional) non-classical logics, which
have no finite multi-valued characteristic matrices, but do have finite Nmatrices,
and thus are decidable.
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4.1 Deterministic matrices
Here we follow the presentation of the subject given in [1]. In what follows,
L is a propositional language and FrmL is its set of well formed formulas.
The metavariables ϕ, ψ,..., range over L-formulas, and Γ, ∆,..., over sets of
L-formulas. The standard general method for defining propositional logics is by
using (possibly many-valued) deterministic matrices:
Definition 4.1. A matrix for L is a tuple
P = 〈V ;D;O〉
where
• V is a non-empty set of truth values.
• D (designated truth values) is a non-empty proper subset of V.
• For every n-ary connective ♦ of L, O includes a corresponding function
♦˜ : V n → V
A partial valuation in P is a function v to V from some subset W ⊆ FrmL
which is closed under subformulas, such that for each n-ary connective ♦ of L,
the following holds for all ψ1, ..., ψn ∈W :
v(♦(ψ1, ..., ψn)) = ♦˜(v(ψ1), ..., v(ψn)) (11)
Proposition 4.2. Analycity. Any partial valuation in a matrix P for L, which
is defined on a set of L-formulas closed under subformulas, can be extended to
a full valuation in P .
At this point the importance of analyticity should again be stressed. Because
of this property P is decidable, whenever it is a finite matrix. Moreover, an-
alyticity guarantees semi-decidability of non-theoremhood even if a matrix P
is infinite, provided that it is effective (i.e, the set of truth-values is countable,
the interpretation functions of the connectives are computable, and the set of
designated truth-values is decidable). Note that this implies decidability in case
S also has a corresponding sound and complete proof system.
4.2 Non-deterministic matrices (Nmatrices)
Now we turn into the non-deterministic case. The main difference, is that, alike
deterministic matrices, the non-deterministic ones, given the inputs in the truth
table, assign a set of possible values instead of a single one.
Definition 4.3. A non-deterministic matrix (Nmatrix) for L is a tuple M =
〈V,D,O〉, where:
• V is a non-empty set of truth values.
• D ∈ P(V ) (designated truth values) is a non-empty proper subset of V .
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• For every n-ary connective ♦ of L, O includes a corresponding function
♦˜ : V n → P(V ) \ {∅}
Definition 4.4. 1. A partial dynamic valuation in M (or an M -legal partial
dynamic valuation), is a function v from some subset W ⊆ FrmL to V ,
which is closed under subformulas, such that for each n-ary connective ♦
of L, the following holds for all ψ1, ..., ψn ∈W:
v(♦(ψ1, ..., ψn)) ∈ ♦˜(v(ψ1), ..., v(ψn))
A partial valuation in M is called a valuation if its domain is FrmL.
2. A (partial) static valuation inM (or anM -legal (partial) static valuation),
is a (partial) dynamic valuation (defined in some W ⊆) which satisfies
also the following composability (or functionality) principle: for each n-
ary connective ⋄ of L and for every ψ1, ..., ψn, ϕ1, ..., ϕn ∈ W, if v(ψi) =
v(ϕi) (i = 1, ..., n), then
v(♦(ψ1, ..., ψn)) = v(♦(ϕ1, ..., ϕn))
It is important to remark that ordinary (deterministic) matrices correspond to
the case when each ♦˜ : V n → V is a function taking singleton values only. In
this case there is no difference between static and dynamic valuations, and we
have full determinism.
To understand the difference between ordinary matrices and Nmatrices, recall
that in the deterministic case, the truth-value assigned by a valuation v to a
complex formula is defined as follows: v(♦(ψ1, ..., ψn)) = ♦˜(v(ψ1), ..., v(ψn)).
Thus the truth-value assigned to ♦(ψ1, ..., ψn) is uniquely determined by the
truth-values of its subformulas: v(ψ1), ..., v(ψn). This, however, is not the case
for Nmatrices: in general, the truth-values of ψ1, ..., ψn, do not uniquely deter-
mine the truth-value assigned to ♦(ψ1, ..., ψn), because different valuations hav-
ing the same truth values for ψ1, ..., ψn, can assign different elements of the set
of options ♦˜(v(ψ1), ..., v(ψn)) to ⋄(ψ1, ..., ψn). Therefore the non-deterministic
semantics is non-truth-functional, as opposed to the deterministic one. Now,
we review the standard definitions of logical consequence [1].
Definition 4.5. 1. A (partial) valuation v in M satisfies a formula ψ (v |=
ψ) if (v(ψ) is defined and) v(ψ) ∈ D. It is a model of Γ (v |= Γ) if it
satisfies every formula in Γ.
2. We say that ψ is dynamically (statically) valid in M , in symbols |=dM ψ
(|=sM ψ), if v |= ψ for each dynamics (statics) valuation v in M .
3. ⊢dM (⊢sM ), the dynamic (static) consequence relation induced by M , is
defined as follows: Γ ⊢dM ∆ (Γ ⊢sM ∆) if every dynamic (static) model v
in M of Γ satisfies some ψ ∈ ∆.
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Obviously, the static consequence relation includes the dynamic one, i.e. ⊢sM⊇⊢dM .
Also, for ordinary matrices ⊢sM=⊢dM .
Theorem 4.6. Let M be a two-valued Nmatrix which has at least one proper
non-deterministic operation. Then there is no finite family of finite ordinary
matrices F, such that ⊢dM ψ iff ⊢F ψ.
Theorem 4.7. For every (finite) Nmatrix M, there is a (finite) family of ordi-
nary matrices F , such that ⊢sM=⊢F .
Thus, only the expressive power of the dynamic semantics based on Nmatri-
ces is stronger than that of ordinary matrices. The following theorem [3] is a
generalization of Proposition 4.2 to the case of Nmatrices:
Proposition 4.8. (Analycity) Let M = 〈V,D,O〉 be an Nmatrix for L, and let
v′ be a partial valuation in M . Then v′ can be extended to a (full) valuation in
M .
It is easy to show that, as in the case of ordinary matrices, Proposition 4.8
implies the following Theorem:
Theorem 4.9. Non-theoremhood of a logic which has an effective characteristic
NmatrixM is semi-decidable. IfM is finite, or L also has a sound and complete
formal proof system, then L is decidable.
The following definition was presented in [62]:
Definition 4.10. Let M1 = 〈V1, D1, O1〉 and M2 = 〈V2, D2, O2〉 be Nmatrices
for L.
1. M1 is a refinement ofM2 if V1 ⊆ V2, D1 = D2∩V1, and ♦˜M1(x) ⊆ ♦˜M2(x)
for every n-ary conective ♦ of L and every tuple x ∈ V n1 .
2. Let F be a function that assigns to each x ∈ V a non-empty set F (x),
such that F (x1) ∩ F (x2) = ∅ if x1 6= x2. The F -expansion of M1 is
the following Nmatrix MF1 = 〈VF , DF , OF 〉: VF =
⋃
x∈V F (x), DF =⋃
x∈D F (x), and ♦˜MF1 (y1, ..., yn) =
⋃
z∈♦˜M1 (x1,...,xn) F (z) whenever ♦ is
an n-ary connective of L, and xi ∈ V , yi ∈ F (xi) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We say that M2 is an expansion of M1 if M2 is the F -expansion of M1
for some function F .
Expanding an Nmatrix M does not change the original logic (induced by M),
while refining M may do so:
Proposition 4.11. 1. If M1 is an expansion of M2, then ⊢M1=⊢M2 .
2. If M1 is a refinement of M2, then ⊢M2⊆⊢M1
Definition 4.12. Let M = 〈V,D,O〉 be an Nmatrix for a language which in-
cludes the positive fragment of the classical logic (LK+). We say that M is
adequate for this language, in case that the following conditions are satisfied:
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1. ∧˜:
If a ∈ Dand b ∈ D, then a∧˜b ⊆ D
If a 6∈ D, then a∧˜b ⊆ V \D
If b 6∈ D, then a∧˜b ⊆ V \D
2. ∨˜:
If a ∈ D, then a∨˜b ⊆ D
If b ∈ D, then a∨˜b ⊆ D
If a 6∈ D y b 6∈ D, then a∨˜b ⊆ V \D
3. ⊃˜:
If a 6∈ D, then a⊃˜b ⊆ D
If b ∈ D, then a⊃˜b ⊆ D
If a ∈ D and b 6∈ D, then a⊃˜b ⊆ V \D
5 Nmatrices for the quantum formalism
As we have seen in section 3, the Kochen-Specker theorem forbids the existence
of an homomorfism from the lattice of quantum propositions to two valued alge-
bra B2. There, we showed how one of the most important presuppositions of the
Kochen-Specker contradiction can be related to the logical notion of truth func-
tionality. Given that valuations in a semantics based in non-deterministic ma-
trices are not, in general, truth functional, they could provide an interesting way
of describing those formal aspects quantum theory related to Kochen-Specker-
like contextuality. Thus, given that quantum states cannot be interpreted in
terms of classical (deterministic) valuations, in this section we aim to describe
them as valuations of a non-deterministic semantics. It turns out that there are
several ways to associate non-deterministic matrices to the quantum formal-
ism. Furthermore, we show that quantum states can be described as valuations
associated to a very particular form of non-deterministic truth tables.
5.1 Construction of the N-matrix for the quantum formal-
ism
In this section we build the canonical N-matrices of the quantum formalism. We
use the lattice of propositions P(H) appearing in 4 and the physical constrains
imposed by the properties of quantum states, in such a way that the valuations
defined by our matrices are exactly those given by quantum states. Let V = [0, 1]
and D = {1}. A proposition will be true if and only if its valuation yields the
value 1, and it is false for any other value (this is connected to the standard
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quantum logical notion of truth; see discussion in [27]). In order to build the
matrices, we have into account first, that for every state µ, whenever P⊥Q,
we have µ(P ∨ Q) = µ(P ) + µ(Q) (it follows from 4). Let us now study the
disjunction function ∨˜ : V × V → P(V ) \ {∅}. Using 3.1, we obtain
⇒ max(µ(P ), µ(Q)) ≤ µ(P ∨Q) ≤ 1
In terms of valuations (denoted generically by v), this can be written as
⇒ max(v(P ), v(Q)) ≤ v(P ∨Q) ≤ 1
Thus, the following equality holds:
∨˜(a,b) = [max(a, b), 1] (12)
In this way, the natural candidate for the disjunction matrix is given by
P Q ∨˜
If P ⊥ Q a b {a+ b}
if P 6⊥ Q a b [max(a, b); 1]
(13)
Let us now turn to the conjunction function ∧˜ : V × V → P(V ) \ {∅}. Using
again 3.1, it easily follows that
µ(P ∧Q) ≤ min(µ(P ), µ(Q))
Thus, whenever a valuation v(· · · ) assigns v(P ) = a and v(Q) = b (a, b ∈ V ),
the natural candidate for the interpretation set of the conjunction satisfies:
∧˜(a,b) = [0,min(a, b)] (14)
and the corresponding Nmatrix is given by
P Q ∧˜
if P ≤ Q a b {a}
if Q ≤ P a b {b}
if P ⊥ Q a b {0}
if P 6⊥ Q a b [0,min(a, b)]
(15)
It remains to give the table for the negation ¬˜ : V → P(V ) \ {∅}. The most
natural candidate compatible with the properties of quantum states 4 is given
by ¬˜(a) = {1− a}, and then
P ¬˜(P )
a {1− a} (16)
This is a deterministic negation, in the sense that its interpretation set is a
singleton, which is a function of a. Thus, all valuations are forced to take that
value.
The above three tables impose the restrictions for all possible valuations.
A closer look to them, reveals that for finite dimensional models they contain
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the very conditions of Gleason’s theorem. Thus, the only possible valuations
compatible with the above tables are exactly those representing quantum states
(i.e., defined by quantum density matrices). For infinite dimensional models of
quantum systems, one could still try to impose a σ-additivity condition (such as
the one appearing in 4), and apply again Gleason’s theorem to obtain quantum
states. But this involves the use of a condition on a denumerable set of propo-
sitions. We will study this possibility in a future work. It is also important to
remark that there are generalized versions of Gleason’s theorem [63], that can
be used to study additive (and non-necessarily additive quantum states), and
could be an interesting subject of study in future works.
One last thing remains. According to the above defined tables, we may
ask: are the above tables truth-functional with regard to the quantum logical
connectives? To begin with, notice that the negation table is classical. More
concretely: is it true that for every two propositions P and Q, and every quan-
tum logical connective ⋄, if the probabilities assigned to P and are a and b,
respectively, the value of the probability of P ⋄ Q is determined by a and b?
This question is tricky, because, even if the valuations are valued into sets with
more than one element, Gleason’s theorem could impose, in principle, restric-
tions in such a way that all states that assign probabilities a and b to P and Q,
respectively, assign the same value for the composed proposition P ⋄Q. This is
explicitly the case when P ⊥ Q: for all ρ ∈ S(H), if tr(ρP ) = a and tr(ρP ) = b,
we have that tr(ρ(P ∨Q)) = a+ b and tr(ρ(P ∧Q)) = 0. But it turns out that
this is not the case when P 6⊥ Q, as the following examples show.
Consider first a four dimensional quantummodel and the basis {|a〉, |b〉, |c〉, |d〉}.
Consider the propositions defined by the projection operators P = |a〉〈a| +
|b〉〈b| and Q = |b〉〈b| + |c〉〈c|. Clearly, R := P ∧ Q = |b〉〈b| and P 6⊥ Q.
We chose for simplicity α, β, γ, δ ∈ R and consider the state |ψ〉 = √α|a〉 +√
β|b〉 + √γ|c〉 + √δ|d〉. Thus, the probabilities of the elements of the basis
are given by α, β, δ and γ, respectively, and the normalization condition reads
α + β + γ + δ = 1. A simple calculation yields that the probability of P is
pψ(P ) = tr(|ψ〉〈ψ|P ) = α + β, the probability of Q is pψ(Q) = tr(|ψ〉〈ψ|Q) =
β + γ and the probability of R is pψ(P ∧ Q) = tr(|ψ〉〈ψ|(P ∧ Q)) = β. Now,
chose 0 < ε < α, β, γ, δ, and consider a new quantum state defined by |ψε〉 =
(
√
α+ ε|a〉 + √β − ε|b〉 + √γ + ε|c〉 + √δ − ε|d〉 (the reader can easily check
that the normalization is correct). Now, we have that the probability of P
is pψε(P ) = tr(|ψε〉〈ψε|P ) = α + ε + β − ε = α + β, the probability of Q is
pψε(Q) = tr(|ψε〉〈ψε|Q) = β − ε + γ + ε = β + γ and the probability of R is
pψε(P ∧ Q)) = tr(|ψε〉〈ψε|(P ∧ Q) = β − ε 6= β. Thus, we have two different
states that assign the same probabilities to P and Q, but different values to
P ∧Q.
With the same notation as in the previous example, we have that S :=
P ∨ Q = |a〉〈a| + |b〉〈b| + |c〉〈c|. Again, we have P 6⊥ Q, pψ(P ) = α + β and
pψ(Q) = β + γ. For the disjunction, we now have pψ(P ∨ Q) = tr(|ψ〉〈ψ|(P ∨
Q)) = α + β + γ. Computing the probabilities for state |ψε〉, we obtain again
pψε(P ) = α + β and pψε(Q) = β + γ. But the probability of the disjunction is
given by pψε(P ∨Q) = tr(|ψε〉〈ψε|(P ∨Q) = α+ε+β−ε+γ+ε = α+β+γ+ε 6=
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α+β+ γ. Thus, we have two different states that assign the same probabilities
to P and Q, but different values to P ∨Q.
These examples show that the truth tables defined above, define a strictly
non-deterministic semantics: the valuations which are compatible with those
tables are dynamic. Are they static? The following example shows that this is
not the case.
Consider a three dimensional Hilbert space with a basis {|a〉, |b〉, |c〉}. Define
P = |a〉〈a| and Q = |ϕ〉〈ϕ| (where |ϕ〉 = 1√
2
(|a〉 + |b〉))). The conjunction is
given by P ∨ Q = |a〉〈a| + |b〉〈b| (due to the fact that they are two linearly
independent vectors, they define a closed subspace of dimension 2). Consider
the state |φ〉 = |b〉. Thus, we have pφ(P ) = tr(|b〉〈b|a〉〈a|) = 0, pφ(Q) = 12
and pφ(P ∨ Q) = tr(|b〉〈b|(P ∨ Q)) = tr(|b〉〈b|(|a〉〈a| + |b〉〈b|)) = 1. Consider
now P ′ = |c〉〈c| and Q′ = Q. We again have pφ(P ′) = tr(|b〉〈b|c〉〈c|) = 0 and
pφ(Q
′) = 12 . The disjunction is given by P
′ ∨Q′ = |ϕ〉〈ϕ|+ |c〉〈c| (we are using
that |c〉 and |ϕ〉 are orthogonal). But now, pφ(P ′ ∨ Q′) = tr(|b〉〈b|(|ϕ〉〈ϕ| +
|c〉〈c|)) = tr(|b〉〈b|ϕ〉〈ϕ|) + tr(|b〉〈b|c〉〈c| = 12 + 0 = 12 6= 1. Thus, we have
obtained that, given two pairs of propositions, P and Q, and P ′ and Q′, there
is a valuation vφ(...) = tr(|φ〉〈φ|(...)) (induced by the quantum state |φ〉), that
satisfies vφ(P ) = vφ(P
′), vφ(Q) = vφ(Q′), but vφ(P ∨Q) 6= vφ(P ′ ∨Q′). Thus,
in general, the valuations will not be static. Thus, the valuations defined by
quantum states will not be static in general.
5.2 N-Matrices For Generalized States
In this section we turn into the non-deterministic matrices for generalized proba-
bilistic models, whose propositional structures are defined by arbitrary complete
orthomodular lattices and states are defined by 7. We proceed in a similar way
to that of the quantum case, but it is important to take into account that (a)
Gleason’s theorem will no longer be available in many models, and (b) the dif-
ference between additivity and σ-additivity, imposes a great restriction if one
now wants to link that valuations with states (see [63] for generalizations of
Gleason’s theorem and the discussion about the difference between additivity
and σ-additivity). In the general case, it will be possible to affirm that every
state defines a valuation, but there will exist valuations which are no states.
Furthermore, if the lattice admits no states [64], then, the matrices that we
define will admit no valuations at all.
It is also very important to remark that the Nmatrices introduced below,
work well when the lattices are Boolean algebras. This means that classical
(Kolmogorovian) probabilistic models also fall into our scheme. But, alike the
Nmatrices of the quantum case defined in the previous section, classical prob-
abilistic models always admit global valuations whose range is equal to the set
{0, 1}. Due to the KS and Gleason’s theorems, the range of global valuations
associated to the Nmatrices associated to quantum systems, cannot be equal to
{0, 1}. A similar observation holds for more more general probabilistic models,
provided that they are contextual enough (and they admit states).
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Let us first build the interpretation set for the conjunction function ∧˜ :
V × V → P(V ) \ {∅}. Using 3.1, it easily follows that
µ(p ∧ q) ≤ min(µ(p), µ(q))
Thus, whenever a valuation v(· · · ) assigns v(p) = a and v(q) = b (a, b ∈ V ), the
natural candidate for the interpretation set of the conjunction is given by:
∧˜(a,b) = [0,min(a, b)] (17)
Looking at the above equation for the different values of its arguments, and
considering that the only designed value is 1, we obtain the following table for
the interpretation of the conjunction:
p q ∧˜
if p ≤ q a b {a}
if q ≤ p a b {b}
if p ⊥ q a b {0}
if p 6⊥ q a b [0,min(a, b)]
(18)
Let us now study the disjunction function ∨˜ : V ×V → P(V )\ {∅}. Using again
3.1, we obtain
⇒ max(µ(p), µ(q)) ≤ µ(p ∨ q) ≤ 1
and
⇒ max(v(p), v(q)) ≤ v(p ∨ q) ≤ 1
. Thus, the interpretation set is given by:
∨˜(a,b) = [max(a, b), 1] (19)
yielding the table
p q ∨˜
If p⊥q a b {a+ b}
if p 6⊥ q a b [max(a, b); 1]
(20)
For the negation ¬˜ : V → P(V ) \ {∅}, the standard one given by 7 (in the
following section, we will consider more general possibilities). Thus, we define
¬˜(a) = {1− a} to obtain.
p ¬˜(p)
a {1− a} (21)
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5.3 Nmatrices for systems with finite precision for mea-
surements
In this section we generalize the previous tables by including the possibility
of considering finite precision measurements. By this, we mean a situation in
which it is not possible to determine if a proposition is true, but it is possible
to assure that it is different from 1 within a certain range.
Thus, we now take the sets V = [0, 1] and D = [α, 1], with α ∈ (0, 1]. By
setting α = 1, we obtain the case of the previous section. In this section, α is
considered as a generic parameter.
Let us start by defining the interpretation set for the conjunction ∧˜ : V ×V →
P(V ) \ {∅}. In what follows, a and b represent the respective values for the
valuations of p and q: v(p) = a and v(q) = b.
• If a, b ∈ D, then:
p ∧ q ≤ p⇒ µ(p ∧ q) ≤ µ(p), and
p ∧ q ≤ q ⇒ µ(p ∧ q) ≤ µ(q)
We take v(p) = µ(p) = a and v(q) = µ(q) = b, then µ(p∧q) ≤ a and µ(p∧q) ≤ b.
Then, µ(p ∧ q) ≤ min(a, b).
Given that µ is positive definite, then 0 ≤ µ(p ∧ q) ≤ min(a, b). This suggests
us to take the interpretation set for the conjunction for the case where both
values are designed as:
a∧˜b ⊆ [0,min(a, b)]
It is important to remark that with this interpretation set, it could be the
case that the valuation selects a non-designed value, even when both input
elements are designed. This makes our matrix non adequate (from the point
of view of Avron’s criterion). Avron uses this criterion to give unicity proofs
for matrices given a certain language and conditions. We are more interested
in existence, rather than unicity. But, if necesary, we could apply a similar
criterion. If we are interested in an adequate matrix, then, we must restrict the
interpretation set of the conjunction for this case. The most natural choice is:
a∧˜b ⊆ [0,min(a, b)] ∩D; D = [α, 1] (22)
In our case, the last adequacy is not necessary, given that Gleason’s theorem
imposes its own restrictions on the valuations.
• Si a ∈ D, b 6∈ D
Proceeding similarly as before, p ∧ q ≤ p⇒ µ(p ∧ q) ≤ µ(p)
p ∧ q ≤ q ⇒ µ(p ∧ q) ≤ µ(q)
Thus, µ(p ∧ q) ≤ min(a, b), but now we know which is the smallest between a
and b, given that b is not designed. Thus,
0 ≤ µ(p ∧ q) ≤ b
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This suggest the following interpretation:
a∧˜b ⊆ [0, b] ⊆ V \D (23)
It is easy to check that this case satisfies the adequacy criterion without the
necessity of restricting the set.
• If a 6∈ D, b ∈ D
This case is totally analogous. The only difference is that now, the minimum is
a instead of b.
0 ≤ µ(p ∧ q) ≤ a
Thus:
a∧˜b ⊆ [0, a] ⊆ V \D (24)
Finally, we consider the case in which two elements of the disjunction have
undesigned values.
• a, b 6∈ D
We obtain
0 ≤ µ(p ∧ q) ≤ min(a, b), , thus
a∧˜b ⊆ [0,min(a, b)] ⊆ V \D (25)
Proceeding in an analogous way, we now obtain the interpretation set of the
disjunction:
∨˜ : V 2 → 2V \ {∅}
• If a, b ∈ D
Given that p ≤ p ∨ q and q ≤ p ∨ q, then µ(p) ≤ µ(p ∨ q) and µ(q) ≤ µ(p ∨ q).
⇒ a ≤ µ(p ∨ q) and b ≤ µ(p ∨ q)
⇒ max(a, b) ≤ µ(p ∨ q) ≤ 1
Thus,
a∨˜b ⊆ [max(a, b), 1] ⊆ D (26)
• If a ∈ D, b 6∈ D or a 6∈ D, b ∈ D
a∨˜b ⊆ [max(a, b), 1] ⊆ D (27)
• If a, b 6∈ D
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If none of the two terms has a designed value, one possibility is to proceed as
in the first case with the conjunction (by restricting our set in such a way that
it satisfies the adequacy criterium).
a∨˜b ⊆ [max(a, b), 1]
A valuation for two projections with non-designed values, could give us a de-
signed value. If we want to avoid this, and using the Avron’s criterion, the
interpretation set should be:
a∨˜b ⊆ [max(a, b), 1] ∩ (V \D) (28)
We will not follow this choice, given that Gleason’s theorem imposes stronger
restrictions on valuations. Let us turn now on negation:
¬˜ : V → 2V \ {∅}
We now study negation, considering three different choices. Given that we are
working with orthomodular lattices, we have that µ(p⊥) = 1 − µ(p). In terms
of valuations, this condition reads: v(p⊥) = 1− v(p). Thus, it seems reasonable
to chose a negation as follows (in order to obtain a non-deterministic negation):
Case 1:
p ¬˜p
a ∈ D [0, 1− a]
a 6∈ D [1− a, 1]
This case generalizes the standard quantum one, leaving 1 − a (deterministic
negation) as a respective bound.
Case 2:
p ¬˜p
a ∈ D [1− a, α)
a 6∈ D [α, 1− a]
Finally, we can always define a deterministic negation, which is more natural
for the standard quantum case:
Case 3:
p ¬˜p
a ∈ V 1− a
In this case, independently of whether the value of a is designated or not, the
ngation yields 1 − a. If we take D = {1} as in the standard quantum logical
case, then, the negation of a given designed value would give a non-designed
result. But the converse is not necessarily true.
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6 Logical consequence in non-Kolmogorovian struc-
tures
As is well known, the inclusion relationship between projection operators is
not –from a logical point of view– a true implication. From a purely logical
perspective, one of the goals of adapting the quantum formalism to the system
of non-deterministic matrices is to study the inclusion relationship in connection
the notion of logical consequence defined by the Nmatrices. By constructing a
suitable Nmatrix semantics for the quantum formalism, we would obtain the
benefits of the notion of logical consequence developed by Avron and Zamansky
[1].
One of the most important advantages of the Nmatrix system is that, given
that it is represented by finite matrices, it is possible to prove its decidabil-
ity. But, in our construction –in order to obtain a closer connection with the
quantum formalism– we have assumed that V is non-denumerable. But it is
always possible to reduce the cardinality of V to a denumerable set, without
affecting the set of theorems. This is directly related to the definitions of F-
expansion and refinement 4.10 and the content of proposition 4.11 (that relates
the corresponding sets of theorems).
6.1 Is it possible to consider the quantum Nmatrix as a
refinement of an F-expansion of a finite Nmatrix?
In this section we show that the Nmatrix constructed for the orthomodular
lattice of projection operators for the case of a unique designed value, is a
particular refinement of an F-expansion of a finite Nmatrix. We will leave
aside, for a moment, the constrains imposed by Gleason’s theorem. We will not
consider the case with more designated values either. In order to reach this aim,
we must give first some definitions with regard to expansions and refinements.
For a more detailed treatment of the techniques used in this section (and proofs
and propositions), we refer the reader to [65].
We say that M2 is a simple refinement of M1, if it is a refinement (definition
4.10) and it satisfies V1 = V2. For every expansion function F and y ∈
⋃
Im(F ),
we denote by F˜ [y] the unique element x ∈ dom(F ) such that y ∈ F (x).
Definition 6.1. Let M1 = 〈V1,D1,O1〉 and M2 = 〈V2,D2,O2〉 be Nmatrices
and F an expansion function for M1. We say M2 is an F-rexpansion of M1 if
it is a refinement of the F-expansion of M1. It is called:
1. simple if it is a simple refinement of the F-expansion of M1.
2. preserving if F (x) ∩ V2 6= ∅ for every x ∈ V1.
3. strongly preserving if it is preserving, and for every x1, ..., xn ∈ V2, ⋄ ∈
♦n
L
, and y ∈ ⋄˜1(F˜ [x1], ..., F˜ [xn]) it holds that the set F (y) ∩ ⋄˜2(x1, ..., xn)
is not empty.
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Loosely speaking, being a preserving rexpansion amounts to keeping at least
one “copy” of every original truth value. Being strongly preserving means that
this property holds not only for the set of truth values, but also for the inter-
pretation of the connectives.
Proposition 6.2. Every simple rexpansion is preserving, every expansion is a
strongly preserving rexpansion, and every preserving rexpansion of a matrix is
strongly preserving.
The proof can be found in [65].
Proposition 6.3. M2 = 〈V2,D2,O2〉 is an rexpansion of M1 = 〈V1,D1,O1〉 iff
there is a function f : V2 → V1 such that:
1. For every x ∈ V2, x ∈ D2 iff f(x) ∈ D1.
2. For every x1, ..., xn ∈ V2 and y ∈ ⋄˜2(x1, ..., xn), it holds that f(y) ∈
⋄˜1(f(x1), ..., f(xn)).
Proposition 6.4. If M2 is a rexpansion of M1 then ⊢M1⊆⊢M2 . Moroever, if
M2 is strongly preserving then ⊢M1=⊢M2 .
Now we proceed to find a finite Nmatrix of which our quantum Nmatrix is an
expansion. This Nmatrix will not be unique, given that there exist infinitely
many rexpansions for a given Nmatrix, and each matric can be the rexpansion
of different Nmatrixes. Each one of these rexpansions is compromised with
different expansion functions and different degrees of refinement. Once one of
these Nmatrixes is found, it is possible to use proposition 6.4 in order to relate
the sets of theorems.
Let V2 = [0, 1], V1 = {V, T, F}, D1 = {1} and f : V2 → V1, such that
f(1) = V ; f(0) = F ; f(α) = T, α ∈ (0, 1)
In this case, we aim to find a finite Nmatrix of three values, in such a way that
the quantum Nmatrix be its expansion. We then propose an Nmatrix of two
values.
Applying item 1 of proposition 6.3: x ∈ {1} iff f(x) ∈ D1 ⇒ D1 = {1}.
Now we apply item 2 of proposition 6.3 in order to find the interpretation set
for each connective.
∀x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1], y ∈ ∨˜Q(x1, x2) = [max(x1, x2), 1]⇒ f(y) ∈ ∨˜1(f(x1), f(x2))
If x1 = x2 = 0, then y ∈ [0, 1]⇒ f(y) ∈ ∨˜1(f(0), f(0)). Thus,
∨˜1(f, f) = {V, T, F} (29)
If x1 = x2 = 1,
y ∈ ∨˜Q(1, 0) = [max(1, 0), 1] = {1} ⇒ f(1) ∈ ∨˜1(V, F )
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Then,
∨˜1(V, F ) = {V } (30)
If x1 = 0, x2 = α;α ∈ (0, 1), y ∈ [α, 1]⇒ f(y) ∈ ∨˜1(F, T ).
∨˜1(F, T ) = {V, T } (31)
By following this procedure, it is possible to find all the elements of the inter-
pretation set of the conjunction. The following table resumes all the results of
a possible candidate:
∨˜1 V T F
V {V } {V } {V }
T {V } {V, T } {V, T }
F {V } {V, T } {V, T, F}
(32)
It is important to remark that the interpretation set for the disjunction is one
among several possibilities. And that in this case, we are not imposing the
constrains related to Gleason’s theorem. In the same way, it is possible to find
the set corresponding to the conjunction. The results are shown in the following
table:
∧˜1 V T F
V {V, T, F} {F, T } {F}
T {T, F} {T, F} {F}
F {F} {F} {F}
(33)
For the negation, we have:
V T F
¬˜1 {F} {T } {V } (34)
For the above table we have taken the standard negation associated to the
lattice. If V1 = {V, F} is chosen as the initial set (instead of V1 = {V, T, F}), it
is possible to proceed as follows:
f : V2 → V1
,
such that
f(1) = V, f(α) = F, α ∈ [0, 1)
and proceeding in an analogous way as before, we arrive at the following table:
∨˜1 V F
V {V } {V }
F {V } {V, F}
(35)
and a similar procedure can be applied to the rest of the connectives.
26
6.2 Double negation
Now we turn on some problems that could emerge with the behaviour of the
double negation. A more detailed study of the negation and double negation
is left for future work. We consider both, logical and physical motivations in
order to proceed.
Given its relation with the orthogonal complement in Hilbert spaces, it is
desirable that the negation satisfies the principle of double negation. We now
show that, pass not respecting this principle strictly, the negation ¬˜1 has a very
particular behaviour that could be related to the classical limit between logics.
It is direct to prove that the negtion ¬˜3 satisfies the double negation principle.
Although the two first candidates do not behave properly in this sense, their
existence is interesting on its own, given that, in a different domain, we may
need a different type of negation. As an example, in quantum circuits it is
possible to define an operation which is the square root of the negation.
Let us now analyze the double negation for the first proposal:
p ¬˜p
a ∈ D [0, 1− a]
a 6∈ D [1− a, 1]
For the double negation, we have:
v(¬(¬p)) ∈ ¬˜(v(¬p))
v(¬p) ∈ ¬˜(v(p))
If v(p) takes a designed value.
• If v(p) = a ∈ D = [α, 1]
⇒ ¬˜(a) = [0, 1− a], and v(¬p) ∈ [0, 1− a]
Sea b = v(¬p) ∈ [0, 1− a] ⊆ (V \D) (if 0.5 < α).
⇒ v(¬(¬p)) ∈ ¬˜(b) = [1− b, 1],
given that b is not a designed value. Thus, the double negation maps designed
values to designed values. If we order all possible values:
0 ≤ b ≤ 1− a ≤ α ≤ a ≤ 1− b ≤ 1
This proves that, after taking two times the negation of a designed value, the
value for the double negation must be chosen out of a set which is included in
the set where the original designed value was taken. Taking consecutively the
double negation for the designed case, can concentrate the final interpretation
set for the connective closer to {1}. This does not happens if start with a
non-designed value.
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• If v(p) = a 6∈ D
⇒ ¬˜(a) = [1− a, 1]
Let b be the value that the valuation takes inside this set:
b = v(¬p) ∈ [1− a, 1]
⇒ v(¬(¬p)) ∈ ¬˜(b)
The difference with regard to the previous case is that now, b can be both,
a designed and non-designed value, given that inside the interval [1 − a, 1], in
principle, there could be values of both types. A an example, if α = 0.9 and
a = 0.8, the involved interval would be [0.2, 1], which contains both desgined
and non-designed values. Thus, for the double negation, in this case, we have
to separate the interpretation set depending on the type of value taken by b.
This behavior was already included in the orthodox quantum logical treatment,
where the negation of a true proposition was false, but the negation of something
false is not necessarily true. Thus, we obtain:
⇒ v(¬(¬p)) ∈ ¬˜(b) =
¬˜(b) =
{
[0, 1− b] if b ∈ D
[1-b,1] if b 6∈ D
This means that taking double negation many times, will not necessarily have
as a consequence a concentration of the values of the valuation around 0.
A similar analysis can be made for the second negation presented in this work,
and the conclusion –though not identical– goes in the same direction. The
principle of double negation is not satisfied either.
7 Conclusions
In this work we have shown that:
• Due to the Kochen-Specker theorem, the quantum formalism does not
obey truth functionality (in its canonical sense).
• The set of projection operators admits Nmatrices, and thus, the Nmatrices
formalism can be adapted to quantum mechanics.
• In particular, each quantum state, can be interpreted as a valuation asso-
ciated to a non-deterministic semantics. We have given the explicit form
of their associated Nmatrices and we have proved that the valuations are,
in general, dynamic and non-static.
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• There exist different candidates for non-deterministic semantics which are
compatible with the quantum formalism. We have studied different ex-
amples.
• We sketch how notion of how a logical consequence associated to no de-
terministic semantics can be assigned to the quantum formalism (a study
that should be extended, of course, in future work).
We think that the constructions presented here can open the door to inter-
esting questions in both, the fields of quantum mechanics and logic. On the
physics side, it opens the door to studying axioms for generalized probabilistic
systems using logical axioms. On the logical side, it gives place to a new model
of Nmatrices with possible physical applications.
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